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Abstract
An advanced economy relies on innovation activity for its further technology improvement.
On the other hand a backward economy depends on both imitation from the world technology
frontier and innovation activities – innovation being more skilled-intensive than imitation. In
this paper I theoretically examine the impact of R & D outsourcing from an economy which
is in the innovation-only regime to an imitation-innovation regime. I show that dependence
on imitation activities rises and as a consequence of which share of skilled human capital falls
and both skilled and unskilled human capital shifts from innovation to imitation activities
in the backward economy. As a result proportion of outsourcing from advanced economy
to backward economy falls. Thus, growth rate of the backward economy declines as time
progresses. In the long run backward economy will get into a trap and gap from the world
technology frontier rises, even if it falls in the initial period.
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1 Introduction
The World Investment Report (2005) pointed out that due to the improvement of telecommu-
nication services, the outsourcing of R & D activities to the developing countries, specifically
to the Asian economies, has risen over time. Their finding reveals that around 800 leading
global transnational corporations are operating their R & D centers and R & D based firms in
India and China, mainly in the information communication technology, telecommunication,
pharmaceutical and automobiles sectors. According to the ranking of R & D spending in
2002, China holds the sixth position in the world. Among the developing economies, South-
East Europe and Common Wealth of Independent States, China, Korea, Russian Federation,
India and Singapore respectively hold the first, second, fifth, sixth and eighth positions. In
view of the growing importance of R & D outsourcing, I would like to study the impact
of this phenomena on the growth rate and the convergence process in both advanced and
backward countries.
Let us first discuss the consequences of R & D outsourcing on growth in the destination
economy. Being a backward economy (that is, in the imitation-innovation regime) it would
direct a proportion of their skilled and unskilled human capital in the R & D activity of
the advanced economy (this one being in the innovation-only regime) instead of its own
technology improvement thus lowering its own economic growth rate. On the one hand, this
might raise the income of skilled and unskilled human capital in the short run. In the long run
this may increase the technology gap between the destination (backward) economy and the
originating (advanced) economy. Specifically, seemingly, that in the short run outsourcing
may increase the income level of the destination economy but in the long run it may be
harmful for it. So, there is an intertemporal trade off in the benefit of different generations.
Along with these, I are also considering that as an advanced economy outsources their R
& D activity, there is a possibility of technology diffusion. But with the assumption that
the possibility of diffusion is limited I would like to study the impact of these two opposite
effects on the growth rate and the convergence condition of the destination economy.
I next discuss the consequences of R & D activity in the originating economy. There
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also two effects play out. On one hand, attracted by cheap human capital in the relatively
backward economy, an intermediate input producer of the advanced economy would like to
outsource its innovation activity hence spring technological change and economic growth.
But, innovation is skilled human capital intensive and the relative composition of skilled
human capital is low in the backward economy, thus lowering the technological change and
therefore the growth in the short run. So, by considering these two opposing effects I would
like to endogenize the optimal R & D outsourcing by the intermediate input producer in
the advanced economy. Additionally, due to outsourcing, the demand for human capital
decreases in the advanced economy, which may reduce wages and, consequently, income of
the individuals of the advanced economy. Thus, it is possible that in the originating economy
R & D outsourcing may increase the short run benefit of the intermediate input producer
but may reduce the increment to technology level in the long run. In this context, I would
like to study the combined impact of these opposing effects on the long run growth rate of
the advanced economy. Also, I would want to study the convergence prospects of both the
advanced and the backward economy, along with the effects on the income, consumption and
inequality paths of skilled and unskilled human capital in these two countries. To the best
of our knowledge, this would be the first theoretical analysis of the economy wide decision of
outsourcing of R & D activity and the impact of that on growth, inequality and convergence
condition for relatively advanced and backward economies.
The earlier literatures mainly concentrate their studies on outsourcing of basic production
which is mostly unskilled labor intensive. These studies largely tend to focus on the rising
inequality debate within these countries. The phenomenon of rising inequality is attributed
to the skilled biased technical change1 or else to the increase in import competition from the
low-wage countries.2 Supporting the second view Feenstra (1996a) shows that any relative
increment in capital stock of the South or neutral technological progress in South would
1See Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Berman et al. (1994).
2See Leamer (1993 and 1994), Borjas and Ramey (1995), Wood (1994) and Hijzen (2007) show that both
the factors have significant impact.
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raise the wage inequality in both the northern and southern economies.3 But, on contrary,
by introducing the higher productivity improvement due to outsourcing,4 Kamal and Saggi
(2001) theoretically shows that outsourcing of the production activity, lowers the wage gap
between developing and developed economies. By allowing that basic production can shift to
less developed economy through imitation, Sayek and Sener (2006) shows that outsourcing
raises wage inequality in technologically advanced economy and under certain condition a
backward economy might face rising or declining trend in wage inequality.5 empirically
show that in Mexico, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) raises the demand for skilled human
capital and consequently relative wage rate of them. But none of the studies consider that
an advanced economy can also outsource skill-intensive activity and may be a backward
economy can also perform some R & D activity independently. So, I want to shed light on
those issues in the distance to frontier framework.
Instead of taking outsourcing as given, another strand of literature considers the firm
level decision of choosing alternative production strategies of vertical integration at home,
vertical integration at abroad, outsourcing, foreign sourcing, FDI or export. Using a general
equilibrium framework they show that in the absence of firm level heterogeneity or increasing
returns to matching between firms all the firms will opt for the same production activity.6
Another strand of literature shows that when firms have significant market power, in an
oligopolistic setting they show that even when firms are ex-ante symmetric, their make or
buy decision can vary depending upon their cost structure and the strategic policy.7 All
the above discussed papers are talking about production share. But L.C.Lai et al. (2009)
3Also See Feenstra (1996b).
4Instead of the assumption of Feenstra (1996a), that difference in capital stock is the driving fact behind
outsourcing, Glass and Saggi (2001) assume that technology difference in both the economies will play the
role.
5Empirically supported by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Geishecker and Gorg (2008 and 2005)
6See Meiltz (2003), Antras and helpman (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005), Helpman et al.
(2004).
7Chen (2004), Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Leahy and Montagna (2007) and Nickerson and Vanden Bergh
(1999)
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considers only cost reducing R & D and shows that revenue sharing contract raises R & D
outsourcing.
1.1 Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study
Aghion et al. (2009), Vandenbussche et al. (2006) and Basu and Mehra (2014) bring out the
contribution of human capital to economy-wide technological improvements through the two
channels of imitation and innovation. Technological progress is a dual phenomenon which
makes a different use of human capital inputs at different levels of economic growth. When
an economy is far away from the technological frontier, imitation of technologies is the main
engine of total factor productivity growth. The first two mentioned papers also use this
theoretical insight to revisit the empirical relationship between schooling level and growth in
rich countries for developed economy, which the previous research had found to be slightly
negative. Our work aims to extend this line of research to address the following specific
aspects.
In this paper I would like to introduce the concept of R & D outsourcing. Since wage rate
is lower in an imitation-innovation regime, an R & D producer in the innovation-only regime
would like to outsource their R & D activity to another country that is in the former regime.
However, the skill composition is lower in an imitation-innovation regime. As a consequence
of these two opposing effects, R & D producer would optimally choose the proportion of R
& D that he/ she wants to outsource. On the other hand, due to outsourcing the resources
(that is, skilled and unskilled human capital) of the backward economy are diverted to
the technology improvement of the advanced economy. In one hand, outsourcing reduces
the technology improvement of the backward economy. As well as outsourcing changes the
composition of human capital in a backward economy. So, the interaction of all these factors
determines the short run and long run dynamics of the originating economy. In this case I
want to study how R & D outsourcing would change the dynamics of an economy in both the
originating and destination economies. I mainly focus on the impact of R & D outsourcing
on the labor market equilibrium condition, aggregate growth rate, income and consumption
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levels under both the regimes and as well as on the convergence condition of the economy.
Now, I address the research question under this paper
1. Under what economic conditions will an R & D intermediate producer of innovation-
only regime outsource his/ her R & D activity to an imitation-innovation regime?
What proportion of their R & D activity will be outsourced? How does this depend
on the distance of the destination economy from the frontier? How would the R & D
decision of an intermediate producer of innovation-only regime impact the labor market
equilibrium condition in both the economies? Does this alter the growth trajectory of
both the economies?
For this, the research hypothesis is – outsourcing from innovation-only regime to
imitation-innovation regime raises the growth rate of an economy in innovation-only
regime but reduces it for an economy in an imitation-innovation regime.
2. How does outsourcing affect the convergence condition of the two – originating and
destination-economies?
The research hypothesis for this part is that – the convergence to the world technology
frontier becomes more difficult for a relatively technologically backward economy than
the earlier scenario when there was no outsourcing.
2 Economic Environment
2.1 Production
Production of final output requires land which is normalized to one and continuum of mass
one unit of intermediate inputs. To produce one unit of intermediate input I need one unit
of final output. Intermediate input producer of each sector is a monopolist who possess the
highest available technology in that particular sector i in period t. Let us assume discrete
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time interval. I consider Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
Yt = l
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
A1−αit x
α
itdi, 0 < α < 1,
where, Yt is the final output in period t, lt is the total supply of land, Ai,t is the level of
technology in sector i in period t, and xi,t is the amount of intermediate input used in sector
i in period t.
With the assumption that final good sector is perfectly competitive, the price of each of
the intermediate input is equal to its marginal product. That is,
pit =
∂Yt
∂xit
= αA1−αit x
α−1
it ,
where pit denotes the price of the intermediate input in sector i in period t. The monopolist
chooses xit by solving
max
xit
(pitxit − xit).
The monopolist produces the following amount of the intermediate good in sector i in period
t
xit = α
2
1−αAit
Accordingly, he/ she would earn the following amount of profit in sector i in period t
piit = (pit − 1)xit =
(
1
α
− 1
)
α
2
1−αAit = δ1Ait, (1)
where δ =
(
1
α
− 1)α 21−α .
Note that the technology adjusted intermediate inputs and the profit are same for all the
sectors in every period.
2.2 Dynamics of Productivity
R & D sector is different between home and foreign countries. Technology improvement
depends both on imitation and innovation activities in the home country whereas it depends
only on innovation activity in the foreign country. That is, home country is in the diversified
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regime while foreign country is in the innovation-only regime. Both skilled and unskilled
human capital are required for both imitation and innovation activities. Technology im-
provement specification for the home country is
Ait = Ait-1 + λ
[
uσmit s
1−σ
mit
(At-1 − At-1)
At
+ γ uφnit s
1−φ
nit At-1
]
λ > 0, γ > 0, 0 < φ < σ < 1 (2)
where, σ (resp. φ) is the elasticity of the unskilled human capital in the imitation (resp.
innovation) activity, λ measures the efficiency of the overall process of technological progress
and γ measures the relative efficiency of innovation compared to imitation. umit (resp. unit)
represents the level of unskilled human capital engaged in the imitation (resp. innovation)
activity and smit (resp. snit) represents the level of skilled human capital engaged in the
imitation (resp. innovation) activity in the home country. (At-1 − At-1) captures the scope
of imitation. Along with the advantage of backwardness, there is also a disadvantage of
backwardness, as mentioned by Gerschekron (1952). I also divide the scope of imitation by
the targeted world technology level, that is, At. That is more advanced the world leader,
more difficult it is to imitate for a backward economy.
A1. I assume that imitation is more unskilled human capital intensive and innovation
is more skilled human capital intensive. That is, σ > φ.
Now, I discuss the technology improvement specification of the foreign country. I assume
that foreign country is the technology leader. Technology improvement of the world leader
depends how efficiently skilled and unskilled human capital innovate upon its own technology
level.
Ait = Ai,t-1 + λγU
φ
FitS
1−φ
Fit At-1, λ > 0, γ > 0. (3)
where UFit (resp. SFit) denotes the level of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital in the
foreign country.
A2. Innovation is more skilled human capital intensive. That is, φ < 1
2
.
A3. World technology frontier is growing at a constant exogenous rate g¯.
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2.3 Consumption
I assume a one period overlapping generation model. In the first period an individual decides
whether he/ she goes for education. If the decision is yes, then he/ she spends θ fraction
of his/ her first period life in education and works as a skilled worker for the remaining
time. Otherwise, he/ she works as an unskilled worker. I also assume that cognitive ability
differs among individuals. It is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. Moreover, cost
of education has one-one inverse mapping with the cognitive ability of an individual. That
is, cost of education rises as cognitive ability of an individual falls. I assume (1 − θ) is the
cost of education for an individual with θ cognitive ability. I assume log-linear utility of an
individual. It depends on his/ her consumption. Let utility function of kth individual be
Wkt = ckt, (4)
where Wkt and ckt respectively denote life time utility and consumption of kth individual in
period t. Let budget constraint of skilled worker be
ckt = θ wst, (5)
Budget constraint of unskilled worker be
ckt = wut, (6)
where wst (resp. wut) denotes wage rate of skilled (resp. unskilled) worker.
I assume individuals have perfect foresight. There is no population growth. Each parent
has one child. I also assume perfectly competitive labor market. At the end of (t − 1)th
generation, next generation appears.
3 Analytical Result
In this section we derive our main findings.
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3.1 Condition for Outsourcing
First, I find out the condition which determine when a R & D intermediate input producers
of foreign country decide whether to engage in the outsourcing activity. They will outsource
only if the profit of intermediate input producers is higher from outsourcing. Technology
leader relies only on innovation activity for its further technology improvement. By A2,
innovation is skilled intensive. Now, wage rate of skilled worker is lower in the home coun-
try which entails a reduction in the cost of innovation if foreign country outsources. Also
proportion of skilled worker is lower in the home country. So, there is a trade off between
cost and increment of technology. Also, I assume that there is a fixed cost of outsourcing.
An intermediate input producer of foreign country outsources if
(NOH − wOH) + (NOF − wOF)− F ≥ (NWOF − wWOF) (7)
where NOH is the amount of innovation that occurs in the backward economy if advanced
economy outsources, wOH is the cost of innovation in the backward economy if advanced
economy outsources, NOF is the amount of innovation that occurs in the advanced economy
if advanced economy outsources, wOF is the cost of innovation in the advanced economy
if advanced economy outsources, NWOF is the amount of innovation that occurs in the ad-
vanced economy if advanced economy does not outsource, wWOF is the cost of innovation in
the advanced economy if advanced economy does not outsource and F is the fixed cost of
outsourcing.8
NOH − wOH =
[
λδγ u˜φnit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1 − (wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)
]
µ(at-1)
NOF − wOF =
[
λδγ UφFit S
1−φ
Fit At-1 − (wFut UFit + wFst SFit)
]
(1− µ(at-1))
NWOF − wWOF = λδγ UφFit S1−φFit At-1 − (wFut UFit + wFst SFit) (8)
8We are assuming that if intermediate input producer of the home country engage in the R & D activity
of the foreign country then they will not perform innovation activity for their own country. This assumption
is also true in equilibrium. For detailed proof please contact author.
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That is, (NOH − wOH) measures the profit of the intermediate input producer of the foreign
country that he/ she gains from the home country after outsourcing. (NOF −wOF) measures
the profit of the intermediate input producer of the foreign country that he/ she gains from
the foreign country after outsourcing. That is, (NOH−wOH)+(NOF−wOF) measures the total
gross profit of the intermediate input producer of the foreign country after outsourcing. After
deducting the fixed cost of outsourcing (that is, F ), I get the net profit of the intermediate
input producer of the foreign country after outsourcing. Whereas (NWOF − wWOF) measures
the net profit of the intermediate input producer of the foreign country without outsourcing.
Substituting eq. (8) in eq. (7), I get the following condition for outsourcing9
µ(at-1) >
F[{
λδγ u˜φnit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1 − (wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)
}
−
{
λδγ UφFit S
1−φ
Fit At-1 − (wFut UFit + wFst SFit)
}]
(9)
It implies that proportion of outsourcing depends on the profit gap of the originating and
destination economy and the fixed cost of outsourcing. If the above condition is satisfied
then foreign country will engage in outsourcing of the R & D activity. Once they are engaged
in it they will outsource at least as much as mentioned in eq. (9). If the condition in eq.
(9) comes with strict inequality then it implies that profit from outsourcing is strictly higher
than profit without outsourcing. In that case, intermediate input producer of foreign country
will outsource its full R & D activity to the backward economy. That is, µ(at-1) = 1. The
reverse of this condition with strict inequality implies µ(at-1) = 0. Our focus of analysis is
concentrated with the strict equality of eq. (9).
3.2 Maximization Exercise of the Intermediate Input Producer of
the Foreign Country
In this subsection I derive the maximization exercise of the foreign country after outsourcing.
This would enable us to figure out the wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital in
9Detailed Matheatical Derivations are provided in eq. A1 in the Appendix A.
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that case. Let maximization exercise of the foreign country be
max
UFit,SFit
λδγ UφFit S
1−φ
Fit At-1(1− µ(at-1))− (wFut UFit + wFst SFit); (10)
where wFut (resp. wFst) represents wage rate of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital in the
foreign country in period t.
Given the outsourcing decision of an intermediate producer of foreign country wage rate
of skilled and unskilled human capital be10
wFut = λδγφ U
φ−1
Fit S
1−φ
Fit At-1(1− µ(at-1))
wFst = λδγ(1− φ) UφFit S−φFit At-1(1− µ(at-1)) (11)
As proportion of outsourcing increases wage rate of both skilled and unskilled human capital
falls in the foreign country.
Given that all intermediate producers face the same maximization problem, in equilibrium
I have
UFit = UFt, SFit = SFt. (12)
Substituting eq. (11) and eq. (12) in eq. (9), I get11
λδγ UφFt S
1−φ
Ft At-1 µ
2(at-1) +
[
(wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)− λδγ u˜φnit s˜1−φnit At-1
]
µ(at-1) + F = 0
Now, A = λδγ UφFt S
1−φ
Ft At-1 > 0
B =
[
(wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)− λδγ u˜φnit s˜1−φnit At-1
]
C = F > 0
Therefore, µ(at-1) =
−B ±√B2 − 4AF
2A
. (13)
Given that A > 0 and C > 0, µ(at-1) > 0⇒ B < 0.
10Detailed Mathematical Derivations are provided in eq. (A2) in the Appendix A.
11Detailed Mathematical Derivations are Provided in eq. (A4) in the Appendix A.
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3.3 Maximization Exercise of the Intermediate Input Producer of
the Home Country
Now, I look at the maximization exercise of the R & D producer of the home country.
max
umit,smit,u˜nit,s˜nit
Ait-1 + λδ
[
uσmit s
1−σ
mit
(At-1 − At-1)
At
+ γ u˜φnit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1 µ(at-1)
]
− wut (umit + u˜nit)− wst (smit + s˜nit) (14)
where u˜nit (resp. s˜nit) represents the amount of unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital of the
home country which is engaged in the R & D activity of the foreign country what they had
outsourced.
First order condition of the maximization exercise be
LH = Ait-1 + λδ
[
uσmit s
1−σ
mit
(At-1 − At-1)
At
+ γ u˜φnit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1 µ(at-1)
]
− wut (umit + u˜nit)− wst (smit + s˜nit)
∂ LH
∂ umit
= λδσuσ−1mit s
1−σ
mit
(At-1 − At-1)
At
− wut = 0
∂ LH
∂ smit
= λδ(1− σ)uσmit s−σmit
(At-1 − At-1)
At
− wst = 0
∂ LH
∂ u˜nit
= λδγφ u˜φ−1nit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1 µ(at-1) + λδγ u˜
φ
nit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ u˜nit
− wut = 0
∂ LH
∂ s˜nit
= λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnit s˜−φnit At-1 µ(at-1) + λδγ u˜φnit s˜1−φnit At-1
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ s˜nit
− wst = 0 (15)
Given that all intermediate producers face the same maximization problem, in equilibrium
I have
umit = umt, u˜nit = u˜nt, smit = smt, s˜nit = s˜nt. (16)
There is mass 1 of intermediate firms, so that labor market equilibrium condition is
St = smt + s˜nt, Ut = umt + u˜nt. (17)
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Let us define the relative wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital in the imitation
activity. From eq. (15), I get,
wst
wut
=
(1− σ)
σ
umt
smt
(18)
Now, I try to figure out the relative wage of unskilled and skilled human capital in period t.
To find out that first I need to reexpress the proportion of outsourcing in a different way. I
use this expression further in our analysis. Rewriting eq. (13) I get,12
±
[[
(wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)− λδγ u˜φnti s˜1−φnti At-1
]2 − 4AF] 12
= 2A µ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnti s˜
1−φ
nti At-1 − (wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)
]
(19)
To understand the first order condition of the maximization exercise of the intermediate
input producer of the home country, I need to find out the change in the proportion of the
outsourcing due to a change in allocation of unskilled human capital in the innovation activity(
that is, ∂ µ(at-1)
∂ u˜nt
)
. Also I need to know the expression of the change in the proportion of the
outsourcing due to a change in allocation of skilled human capital in the innovation activity(
that is, ∂ µ(at-1)
∂ s˜nt
)
. Now, first I define the change in the proportion of outsourcing due to
a change in allocation of unskilled human capital in the innovation activity. Differentiating
eq. (13) w.r.t u˜nt and using eq. (16), I get,
13
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ u˜nt
=
µ(at-1)
[
λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − wut
]
2A µ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
] (20)
Now, I try to work out the change in the proportion of the outsourcing (that is, µ(at-1)) due
to a change in the allocation of skilled human capital in the innovation actiity (that is, s˜nit).
Differentiating eq. (13) w.r.t s˜nt and using eq. (16), I get,
14
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ s˜nt
=
µ(at-1)
[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
2Aµ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
] (21)
12Detailed Mathematical Derivations are Provided in eq. (A5) in the Appendix A.
13Detailed Mathematical Derivations are Provided in eq. (A6) in the Appendix A.
14Detailed Mathematical Derivations are Provided in eq. (A7) in the Appendix A.
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Now substituting eq. (20) and eq. (21), in eq. (15), I get the wage rate of skilled and unskilled
workers in the innovation activity of the home country. Rearranging those conditions I get,15
wut − λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜1−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)[
λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − wut
] = λδγ u˜φnt s˜1−φnt At-1µ(at-1)
2A µ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
]
=
wst − λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
wut
wst
=
φ
(1− φ)
s˜nt
u˜nt
. (22)
Now, equating relative wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital from imitation and
innovation activities, I get the relative demand of skilled and unskilled human capital in the
innovation activity. That is, from eq. (18) and eq. (22), I get,16
⇒ s˜nt
u˜nt
=
ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt
Ut
(23)
where ψ = σ(1−φ)
φ(1−σ) > 1. Now, I try to figure out the implicit function of the demand of
skilled human capital in the innovation activity. By equating the wage rate of skilled and
unskilled human capital in imitation and innovation activities, I get the implicit solution of
skilled human capital in the innovation activity. Substituting eq. (21) in eq. (15), I get,17[
(1− σ)uσmt s−σmt
(At-1 − At-1)
At
− γ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)
]
[
2Aµ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
]]
= γ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1µ(at-1)
[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
⇒ 2Aµ(at-1)
[
z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
− µ(at-1)
]
− λδγ z(at-1) U
σ
t s˜nt At-1
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ
[
1− z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
]
= 0; (24)
15Detailed Mathematical Derivations are Provided in eqs. (A8), (A9) and (A10) in the Appendix A.
16Detailed Mathematical Derivations are provided in eq. (A11) in the Appendix A.
17Detailed Mathematical Derivations are provided in eqs. (A12-A16) in the Appendix A.
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where z(at-1) =
(1−σ)ψσ
γ(1−φ)
(At-1−At-1)
At At-1
= (1−σ)ψ
σ
γ(1−φ)
(1−at-1)
(1+g¯) At-1
.
As mentioned in eq. (A14), B < 0 ⇒ z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
< 1.
Therefore, from eq. (24), I get,
z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
− µ(at-1) > 0
⇒ µ(at-1) < z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
< 1
⇒ µ(at-1) < 1. (25)
3.4 Labor Supply
In this section I derive the supply curve of skilled and unskilled human capital in period
t. I already know that individuals have different cognitive ability and cost of education
also varies accordingly. Now, an individual goes for education if his/ her lifetime income as
skilled is higher than unskilled. Therefore the cut off level of cognitive ability above which
an individual goes for education is
θ wst = wut
Ut = θ =
wut
wst
Ut =
φ
(1− φ)
[ψ St − (ψ − 1)snt]
Ut
[From eq. (18) and eq. (23)] (26)
3.5 Labor Market in Equilibrium
Now, the interaction of the demand and supply curve of skilled and unskilled human cap-
ital in imitation and innovation activities determine the equilibrium level of skilled and
unskilled human capital in period t in the home country. This in turn determines the
equilibrium allocation of skilled and unskilled human capital in imitation and innovation
activities. Now I want to show that there exist an equilibrium level of skilled and un-
skilled human capital so that participation in both the activities are positive. That is,
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our focus is to show that 0 < snt < St and 0 < unt < Ut. Analytically it is difficult
to find. With the help of simulation I would like to show our findings. I show it for
two distinct cases. In the first (resp. second) case, overall technological progress (that is,
λ) and efficiency of innovation compare to imitation (that is, γ) is less (resp. more) effi-
cient. For the first case arbitrary parameter values are
[
λ, δ, γ, σ, φ, g¯, F, UF , a(1), A(1)
]
=
[0.3, 1, 0.5, 0.7, 0.2, 0.02, 0.001, 0.4, 0.6, 5]. For the second case arbitrary parameter values are[
λ, δ, γ, σ, φ, g¯, F, UF , a(1), A(1)
]
= [0.8, 1, 1, 0.7, 0.2, 0.02, 0.001, 0.4, 0.6, 5]. One can easily
observe that in the two cases all other parameter values are same except λ and γ.
First I would like to study the composition of human capital as time progresses and the
change in it due to a change in the relative gap of an economy’s technology level from the
frontier. With the help of simulation, simultaneously solving eq. (24) and eq. (26), I get that
when technological progress is less efficient (that is, case1), skilled human capital falls and
unskilled human capital rises as gap from the world technology frontier increases. I illustrate
it in figure (1a). As an economy regresses its dependence on imitation rises and innovation
falls. By A1, imitation is unskilled human capital intensive. Thus, as an economy moves
away from the frontier stock of unskilled human capital rises and skilled human capital falls.
However, in case 2, where technological progress is more efficient, as time progresses level
of skilled (resp. unskilled) human capital falls (resp. rises) irrespective of whether economy
progresses or regresses (as shown in figure (1b) (resp. (1c))). Due to outsourcing the home
country performs innovation activity for the foreign country and carries out imitation for
the home country. Therefore, as time progresses dependence on imitation increases (resp.
decreases) and as well as unskilled (resp. skilled) human capital rises (falls) irrespective of
whether economy progresses or regresses. This finding is not in line with Basu and Mehra
(2014). They show that without outsourcing skilled human capital rises as an economy
progresses.
Lemma 1
Under A1,
The stock of skilled human capital decreases and unskilled human capital increases as a
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(a) case1
(b) case2a (c) case2b
Figure 1: Skilled-Unskilled Human Capital
country moves away from or moves to the the world technology frontier, even as the aggre-
gate stock of human capital remains unchanged, for the country which is in the imitation-
innovation regime and which is performing R & D activity for the foreign country.
Now, I would focus on the equilibrium allocation of skilled and unskilled human capital in
the imitation and innovation activities as the distance from the frontier increases or decreases.
In case 1, as an economy regresses both skilled and unskilled human capital rises (resp. falls)
in the imitation (resp. innovation) activity. Whereas, in case 2, as time progresses allocation
of both skilled and unskilled human capital increases (resp. decreases) in the imitation
(resp. innovation) activity irrespective of whether the gap from the world technology frontier
improves or worsens. From Lemma 1 and by A1, as an economy regresses or progresses,
unskilled human capital rises and since imitation is unskilled intensive, imitation attracts
more unskilled human capital. Due to complementaritity, imitation also attracts skilled
human capital and so on. As a result of which both skilled and unskilled human capital rises
(resp. falls) in the imitation (resp. innovation) activity. This finding is not similar with Basu
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(a) case1
(b) case2a (c) case2b
Figure 2: Skilled-Unskilled Human Capital in Imitation and Innovation Activities
and Mehra (2014). They show that without outsourcing as an economy progresses (resp.
regresses) both skilled and unskilled human capital shifts from imitation (resp. innovation)
to the innovation (resp. imitation) activity.
Lemma 2
Under A1,
The equilibrium amount of skilled and unskilled human capital employment decreases in
imitation and increases in innovation activity, as a country moves to or moves away from
the world technology frontier.
3.6 Wage Rate of the Home Country
In this subsection, I define the wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital as time
progresses. By Lemma 1, skilled human capital falls and unskilled human capital rises
irrespective of whether economy progresses or regresses. As an outcome of which marginal
productivity of both skilled and unskilled human capital rises and so does the wage rate.
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(a) case1 (b) case2
Figure 3: Wage Rate of the Home Country
This is not in line with Basu and Mehra (2014). They show that without outsourcing as
economy progresses (resp. regresses), wage rate of skilled human capital rises (resp. falls)
and unskilled human capital falls (resp. rises).
Proposition 1
Under A1,
Due to outsourcing, in the imitation-innovation regime, wage rate of both skilled and
unskilled human capital increases irrespective of whether an economy moves to or moves
away from the world technology frontier.
3.7 Proportion of Outsourcing
In this subsection I look at the equilibrium level of the proportion of outsourcing as time
progresses. Attracted by the lower wage rate of the home country intermediate input pro-
ducers of the foreign country outsource their R & D activity to the home country. Skill
composition of human capital is also lower in the home country. By A2, R & D activity of
the foreign country is skilled intensive. Whereas by Lemma 1, as time progresses propor-
tion of skilled in the home country falls. Moreover, by Proposition 1, wage rate of it rises.
As a consequence of which profit of the intermediate input producer of the foreign country
falls irrespective of whether economy improves or worsens. This leads to a reduction in the
proportion of outsourcing as time progresses.
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(a) case1 (b) case2
Figure 4: Proportion of Outsourcing
Proposition 2
Under A2,
Equilibrium level of R & D outsourcing falls as time progresses irrespective of whether
gap from the world technology frontier improves or worsens.
3.8 Growth Rate
In this subsection I characterize the growth rate of an economy in period t depending on its
distance to frontier. I also characterize the growth enhancing education policy of an economy
depending on its distance to the frontier.
Rearranging the technological progress eq. (2) and summing over all i, one can define
the growth rate of a decentralized economy in period t as
gt =
∫ 1
0
Ait − At−1
At−1
di
= λ uσmt s
1−σ
mt
(At-1 − At-1)
At-1 At
= λ uσmt s
1−σ
mt
(1− at-1)
(1 + g¯)at-1 At-1
(27)
I amassuming that there is no technology diffusion. Even with small amount of diffusion
findings remain unchanged. In case 1 as an economy regresses growth rate falls. While
in case 2 growth rate reduces irrespective of whether economy progresses or regresses. As
time progresses, by Lemma 1, both skilled and unskilled human capital shifts away from
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(a) case1 (b) case2
Figure 5: Growth Rate
innovation to imitation activity. But due to the disadvantage of backwardness, scope of
imitation falls as time progresses and as well as growth rate of the home country. This
finding is not similar with Basu and Mehra (2014).
Proposition 3
Under A2 and A2,
Growth rate of home country falls irrespective of whether distance from the world tech-
nology frontier improves or worsens..
3.9 Dynamics of Distance to Frontier
In case 1, as time progresses distance of an economy from the world technology frontier
rises. Whereas in case 2, initially distance to frontier falls and it seems that even after
outsorcing economy will progress. But after a certain time point the situation gets reverse.
That is, due to outsourcing in the long run home country will get into a trap. For case
1, from Proposition 3, growth rate is falling as time progresses. As a consequence of
which distance of an economy from the world frontier decreases. However in case 2, as time
progresses, growth rate is also falling. But due the high efficiency of overall technology
level (that is, λ) and high efficiency of innovation compared to imitation (that is, γ) growth
rate of home country is initially higher than the world technology leader. As a outcome
of which initially distance of an economy form the world technology frontier falls. But as
time progresses, due ta a significant reduction of skilled human capital as mentioned in
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(a) case1 (b) case2
Figure 6: Dynamics of Distance to Frontier
Lemma 1, growth rate of the home country falls below the growth rate of world leader. As
a consequence of which distance to frontier frontier increases and in the long run economy
will get stuck. This finding is not in line with Basu and Mehra (2014). They show that
without outsouring in the long run all the economies will converge to the world technology
frontier.
Proposition 4
Under A1, A2 and (A3),
Due to outsourcing, in the long run the home country will get into a trap.
4 Conclusion
Technological progress is a dual phenomenon. A backward country can improve its technol-
ogy level by imitating from the frontier or by innovating new knowledge. Advanced economy
relies only on innovation activities for technology improvement. I assume that different types
of human capital are efficient in different activities. I consider a situation where technology
leader is outsourcing a proportion of their R & D activity to a backward economy. We show
that share of unskilled human capital rises as time progresses. As an outcome of which both
skilled and unskilled human capital shifts from innovation to imitation activity. This leads
to a reduction in the proportion of outsourcing from the advanced economy to a backward
economy. In the long run the economy will get stuck and the gap of the country’s techology
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level from the world leader rises.
Our work can be extended in several directions. First, in this entire work, we assume
that new knowledge is freely available to all the economies. Instead, one can characterize the
growth path and the convergence condition of the economy by ruling out the assumption that
world technology level is freely accessible. Second, till now all the work in this area has been
abstracted from international trade in commodities. One can develop a dynamic Ricardian
model of international trade around the core idea of our work and can study cross-sectoral
allocation of skilled and unskilled human capital in the context of international specialization
in goods production and trade. Third, one can analyze the consequences of heterogeneous
cost of education depending on his/ her parental education level and can study the impact
of that on growth rate, inequality and intergenerational mobility of an economy depending
on its distance to frontier. This would certainly yield further insights on the relationship
between distance to frontier and composition of human capital and economic growth.
Appendix A
Condition for Outsourcing
[
λδγ UφFit S
1−φ
Fit At-1 − (wFut UFit + wFst SFit)
]
(1− µ(at-1))
+
[
λδγ u˜φnit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1 − (wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)
]
µ(at-1)− F
≥ λδγ UφFit S1−φFit At-1 − (wFut UFit + wFst SFit)
⇒ µ(at-1) ≥ F[{
λδγ u˜φnit s˜
1−φ
nit At-1 − (wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)
}
−
{
λδγ UφFit S
1−φ
Fit At-1 − (wFut UFit + wFst SFit)
}]
(A1)
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Maximization Exercise of the Intermediate Input Producer of the
Foreign Country
L = λδγ UφFit S1−φFit At-1(1− µ(at-1))− (wFut UFit + wFst SFit)
∂ L
∂ UFit
= λδγφ Uφ−1Fit S
1−φ
Fit At-1(1− µ(at-1))− wFut = 0
∂ L
∂ SFit
= λδγ(1− φ) UφFit S−φFit At-1(1− µ(at-1))− wFst = 0 (A2)
wFut UFit + wFst SFit
= λδγ UφFit S
1−φ
Fit At-1(1− µ(at-1)). (A3)
Substituting eq. (A3) in eq. (A1), I get
µ(at-1) =
F[
{(wFut UFit + wFst SFit)− (wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)} −
{
λδγ UφFit S
1−φ
Fit At-1 − λδγ u˜φnti s˜1−φnti At-1
}]
⇒ λδγ UφFit S1−φFit At-1 µ2(at-1) +
[
(wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)− λδγ u˜φnti s˜1−φnti At-1
]
µ(at-1) + F = 0
(A4)
Maximization Exercise of the Intermediate Input Producer of the
Home Country
In this section I would try to figure out the relative wage rate of unskilled and skilled human
capital. To find out this, first I would like to write the proportion of outsourcing into a
different fashion. For mathematical tractability I need this following expression.
µ(at-1) =
[
λδγu˜φntis˜
1−φ
nti At-1 − (wutu˜nit + wsts˜nit)
]
±
[[
(wutu˜nit + wsts˜nit)− λδγu˜φntis˜1−φnti At-1
]2
− 4AF
] 1
2
2A
⇒ ±
[[
(wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)− λδγ u˜φnti s˜1−φnti At-1
]2 − 4AF] 12
= 2A µ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnti s˜
1−φ
nti At-1 − (wut u˜nit + wst s˜nit)
]
(A5)
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Now, to solve the first order maximization exercise of the intermediate input producer of
the home country first I characterize the change in the proportion of the outsourcing due to
a change in allocation of unskilled human capital in the innovation activity. Differentiating
eq. (13) w.r.t u˜nt and using eq. (16), I get,
2A
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ u˜nt
=
[
λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − wut
]
±
[
(wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)− λδγ u˜φnt s˜1−φnt At-1
] [
wut − λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜1−φnt At-1
][[
(wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)− λδγ u˜φnti s˜1−φnt At-1
]2
− 4AF
] 1
2
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ u˜nt
=
µ(at-1)
[
λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − wut
]
2A µ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
] (A6)
Now, I figure out the the change in the proportion of the outsourcing (that is, µ(at-1)) due
to a change in allocation of skilled human capital in the innovation actiity (that is, s˜nit).
Differentiating eq. (13) w.r.t s˜nt and using eq. (16), I get,
2A
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ s˜nt
=
[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
±
[
(wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)− λδγ u˜φnt s˜1−φnt At-1
] [
wst − λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1
][[
(wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)− λδγ u˜φnt s˜1−φnt At-1
]2
− 4AF
] 1
2
⇒ ∂ µ(at-1)
∂ s˜nt
=
µ(at-1)
[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
2Aµ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
] (A7)
Now, I derive the demand for wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital in the home
country. Now, substituting eq. (A6) in eq. (15), I get
wut = λδγφ u˜
φ−1
nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 µ(at-1) + λδγ u˜
φ
nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ u˜nt
⇒ wut − λδγφ u˜
φ−1
nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 µ(at-1)[
λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − wut
] = λδγ u˜φnt s˜1−φnt At-1µ(at-1)
2A µ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
]
(A8)
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Now substituting eq. (A7) in eq. (15), I get
wst = λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1) + λδγ u˜φnt s˜1−φnt At-1
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ u˜nit
⇒ wst − λδγ(1− φ) u˜
φ
nt s˜
−φ
nt At-1 µ(at-1)[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
] = λδγ u˜φnt s˜1−φnt At-1µ(at-1)
2A µ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
]
(A9)
Now, equating eqs. (A8) and (A9), I get the relative wage rate of unskilled and skilled
human capital of the innovation activity in the home country.
wut − λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜1−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)[
λδγφ u˜φ−1nt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − wut
] = wst − λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
⇒ wut
wst
=
φ
(1− φ)
s˜nt
u˜nt
(A10)
From eq. (18) and eq. (22), I get,
σ
(1− σ)
smt
umt
=
φ
(1− φ)
s˜nt
u˜nt
⇒ u˜nt
s˜nt
=
Ut
ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt (A11)
Now, I try to figure out the implicit function of the equilibrium level of skilled human capital
in the innovation activity. By equating the wage rate of skilled and unskilled human capital
in imitation and innovation activities, I get the implicit solution of skilled human capital in
the innovation activity. Substituting eq. (A7) in eq. (15), I get,
λδ(1− σ)uσmt s−σmt
(At-1 − At-1)
At
= λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)
+ λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1
∂ µ(at-1)
∂ s˜nt
⇒
[
(1− σ)uσmt s−σmt
(At-1 − At-1)
At
− γ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)
]
[
2Aµ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
]]
= γ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1µ(at-1)
[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
(A12)
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Now, I define these above three expressions separately. First, I determine the first expression
of eq. (A12).
(1− σ)uσmt s−σmt
(At-1 − At-1)
At
− γ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)
=
γ(1− φ) Uφt At-1
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]φ
[
z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
− µ(at-1)
]
; (A13)
where z(at-1) =
(1−σ)ψσ
γ(1−φ)
(At-1−At-1)
At At-1
= (1−σ)ψ
σ
γ(1−φ)
(1−at-1)
(1+g¯) At-1
. Now, I determine the second expression
of eq. (A12).
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
=λδγ
Uφt
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]φ
s˜nt At-1
[
1− z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
]
> 0, [since B < 0]
(A14)
Therefore, B < 0 ⇒ z(at-1) Uσ−φt
[ψSt−(ψ−1)s˜nt]σ−φ < 1.
Next, I determine the third expression of eq. (A12).
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
= λδγ(1− φ) U
φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]φ
At-1
[
1− z(at-1)U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
]
> 0. (A15)
Substituting eq. (A13), eq. (A14), eq. (A15) and eq. (A11) in eq. (A12), I get[
(1− σ)uσmt s−σmt
(At-1 − At-1)
At
− γ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 µ(at-1)
]
[
2Aµ(at-1)−
[
λδγ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1 − (wut u˜nt + wst s˜nt)
]]
= γ u˜φnt s˜
1−φ
nt At-1µ(at-1)
[
λδγ(1− φ) u˜φnt s˜−φnt At-1 − wst
]
⇒ 2Aµ(at-1)
[
z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
− µ(at-1)
]
− λδγ z(at-1) U
σ
t s˜nt At-1
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ
[
1− z(at-1) U
σ−φ
t
[ψSt − (ψ − 1)s˜nt]σ−φ
]
= 0 (A16)
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